Microsoft and SQL*Server
Microsoft’s efforts in the database management, analytics, and data connectivity markets. Related subjects include:
- DATAllegro, which is being bought by Microsoft
- (in Text Technologies) Microsoft in the search, online media, and social software markets
- (in The Monash Report) Strategic issues for Microsoft, and Microsoft Office
- (in Software Memories) Historical notes on Microsoft
As part of my series on the keys to and likelihood of success, I outlined some examples from the DBMS industry. The list turned out too long for a single post, so I split it up by millennia. The part on 20th Century DBMS success and failure went up Friday; in this one I’ll cover more recent events, organized in line with the original overview post. Categories addressed will include analytic RDBMS (including data warehouse appliances), NoSQL/non-SQL short-request DBMS, MySQL, PostgreSQL, NewSQL and Hadoop.
DBMS rarely have trouble with the criterion “Is there an identifiable buying process?” If an enterprise is doing application development projects, a DBMS is generally chosen for each one. And so the organization will generally have a process in place for buying DBMS, or accepting them for free. Central IT, departments, and — at least in the case of free open source stuff — developers all commonly have the capacity for DBMS acquisition.
In particular, at many enterprises either departments have the ability to buy their own analytic technology, or else IT will willingly buy and administer things for a single department. This dynamic fueled much of the early rise of analytic RDBMS.
Buyer inertia is a greater concern.
- A significant minority of enterprises are highly committed to their enterprise DBMS standards.
- Another significant minority aren’t quite as committed, but set pretty high bars for new DBMS products to cross nonetheless.
- FUD (Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt) about new DBMS is often justifiable, about stability and consistent performance alike.
A particularly complex version of this dynamic has played out in the market for analytic RDBMS/appliances.
- First the newer products (from Netezza onwards) were sold to organizations who knew they wanted great performance or price/performance.
- Then it became more about selling “business value” to organizations who needed more convincing about the benefits of great price/performance.
- Then the behemoth vendors became more competitive, as Teradata introduced lower-price models, Oracle introduced Exadata, Sybase got more aggressive with Sybase IQ, IBM bought Netezza, EMC bought Greenplum, HP bought Vertica and so on. It is now hard for a non-behemoth analytic RDBMS vendor to make headway at large enterprise accounts.
- Meanwhile, Hadoop has emerged as serious competitor for at least some analytic data management, especially but not only at internet companies.
Otherwise I’d say: Read more
I frequently am asked questions that boil down to:
- When should one use NoSQL?
- When should one use a new SQL product (NewSQL or otherwise)?
- When should one use a traditional RDBMS (most likely Oracle, DB2, or SQL Server)?
The details vary with context — e.g. sometimes MySQL is a traditional RDBMS and sometimes it is a new kid — but the general class of questions keeps coming. And that’s just for short-request use cases; similar questions for analytic systems arise even more often.
My general answers start:
- Sometimes something isn’t broken, and doesn’t need fixing.
- Sometimes something is broken, and still doesn’t need fixing. Legacy decisions that you now regret may not be worth the trouble to change.
- Sometimes — especially but not only at smaller enterprises — choices are made for you. If you operate on SaaS, plus perhaps some generic web hosting technology, the whole DBMS discussion may be moot.
In particular, migration away from legacy DBMS raises many issues: Read more
|Categories: Columnar database management, Couchbase, HBase, In-memory DBMS, Microsoft and SQL*Server, NewSQL, NoSQL, OLTP, Oracle, Parallelization, SAP AG||16 Comments|
Ever more products try to integrate SQL with Hadoop, and discussions of them seem confused, in line with Monash’s First Law of Commercial Semantics. So let’s draw some distinctions, starting with (and these overlap):
- Are the SQL engine and Hadoop:
- Necessarily on the same cluster?
- Necessarily or at least most naturally on different clusters?
- How, if at all, is Hadoop invoked by the SQL engine? Specifically, what is the role of:
- HDFS (Hadoop Distributed File System)?
- Hadoop MapReduce?
- How, if at all, is the SQL engine invoked by Hadoop?
- If something is called a “connector”, then Hadoop and the SQL engine are most likely on separate clusters. Good features include (but these can partially contradict each other):
- A way of making data transfer maximally parallel.
- Query planning that is smart about when to process on the SQL engine and when to use Hadoop’s native SQL (Hive or otherwise).
- If something is called “SQL-on-Hadoop”, then Hadoop and the SQL engine are or should be on the same cluster, using the same nodes to store and process data. But while that’s a necessary condition, I’d prefer that it not be sufficient.
Let’s go to some examples. Read more
|Categories: Cloudera, Data integration and middleware, EAI, EII, ETL, ELT, ETLT, Hadapt, Hadoop, HBase, Hortonworks, MapReduce, Microsoft and SQL*Server, NewSQL, PostgreSQL, SQL/Hadoop integration, Teradata||26 Comments|
Relational DBMS used to be fairly straightforward product suites, which boiled down to:
- A big SQL interpreter.
- A bunch of administrative and operational tools.
- Some very optional add-ons, often including an application development tool.
Now, however, most RDBMS are sold as part of something bigger.
- Oracle has hugely thickened its stack, as part of an Innovator’s Solution strategy — hardware, middleware, applications, business intelligence, and more.
- IBM has moved aggressively to a bundled “appliance” strategy. Even before that, IBM DB2 long sold much better to committed IBM accounts than as a software-only offering.
- Microsoft SQL Server is part of a stack, starting with the Windows operating system.
- Sybase was an exception to this rule, with thin(ner) stacks for both Adaptive Server Enterprise and Sybase IQ. But Sybase is now owned by SAP, and increasingly integrated as a business with …
- … SAP HANA, which is closely associated with SAP’s applications.
- Teradata has always been a hardware/software vendor. The most successful of its analytic DBMS rivals, in some order, are:
- Netezza, a pure appliance vendor, now part of IBM.
- Greenplum, an appliance-mainly vendor for most (not all) of its existence, and in particular now as a part of EMC Pivotal.
- Vertica, more of a software-only vendor than the others, but now owned by and increasingly mainstreamed into hardware vendor HP.
- MySQL’s glory years were as part of the “LAMP” stack.
- Various thin-stack RDBMS that once were or could have been important market players … aren’t. Examples include Progress OpenEdge, IBM Informix, and the various strays adopted by Actian.
The 2013 Gartner Magic Quadrant for Operational Database Management Systems is out. “Operational” seems to be Gartner’s term for what I call short-request, in each case the point being that OLTP (OnLine Transaction Processing) is a dubious term when systems omit strict consistency, and when even strictly consistent systems may lack full transactional semantics. As is usually the case with Gartner Magic Quadrants:
- I admire the raw research.
- The opinions contained are generally reasonable (especially since Merv Adrian joined the Gartner team).
- Some of the details are questionable.
- There’s generally an excessive focus on Gartner’s perception of vendors’ business skills, and on vendors’ willingness to parrot all the buzzphrases Gartner wants to hear.
- The trends Gartner highlights are similar to those I see, although our emphasis may be different, and they may leave some important ones out. (Big omission — support for lightweight analytics integrated into operational applications, one of the more genuine forms of real-time analytics.)
Anyhow: Read more
Oracle announced its in-memory columnar option Sunday. As usual, I wasn’t briefed; still, I have some observations. For starters:
- Oracle, IBM (Edit: See the rebuttal comment below), and Microsoft are all doing something similar …
- … because it makes sense.
- The basic idea is to take the technology that manages indexes — which are basically columns+pointers — and massage it into an actual column store. However …
- … the devil is in the details. See, for example, my May post on IBM’s version, called BLU, outlining all the engineering IBM did around that feature.
- Notwithstanding certain merits of this approach, I don’t believe in complete alternatives to analytic RDBMS. The rise of analytic DBMS oriented toward multi-structured data just strengthens that point.
I’d also add that Larry Ellison’s pitch “build columns to avoid all that index messiness” sounds like 80% bunk. The physical overhead should be at least as bad, and the main saving in administrative overhead should be that, in effect, you’re indexing ALL columns rather than picking and choosing.
Anyhow, this technology should be viewed as applying to traditional business transaction data, much more than to — for example — web interaction logs, or other machine-generated data. My thoughts around that distinction start:
- I argued back in 2011 that traditional databases will wind up in RAM, basically because …
- … Moore’s Law will make it ever cheaper to store them there.
- Still, cheaper != cheap, so this is a technology only to use with you most valuable data — i.e., that transactional stuff.
- These are very tabular technologies, without much in the way of multi-structured data support.
|Categories: Columnar database management, Data warehousing, IBM and DB2, Memory-centric data management, Microsoft and SQL*Server, OLTP, Oracle, SAP AG, Workday||5 Comments|
Hortonworks did a business-oriented round of outreach, talking with at least Derrick Harris and me. Notes from my call — for which Rob Bearden* didn’t bother showing up — include, in no particular order:
- Hortonworks denies advanced acquisition discussions with either Microsoft and Intel. Of course, that doesn’t exactly contradict the widespread story of Intel having made an acquisition offer.
- As vendors usually do, Hortonworks denies the extreme forms of Cloudera’s suggestion that Hortonworks competitive wins relate to price slashing. But Hortonworks does believe that its license fees often wind up being lower than Cloudera’s, due especially to Hortonworks offering few extra-charge items than Cloudera.
- Hortonworks used a figure of ~75 subscription customers. This does not include OEM sales through, for example, Teradata, Microsoft Azure, or Rackspace. However, that does include …
- … a small number of installations hosted in the cloud — e.g. ~2 on Amazon Web Services — or otherwise remotely. Also, testing in the cloud seems to be fairly frequent, and the cloud can also be a source of data ingested into Hadoop.
- Since Hortonworks a couple of times made it seem that Rackspace was an important partner, behind only Teradata and Microsoft, I finally asked why. Answers boiled down to a Rackspace Hadoop-as-a-service offering, plus joint work to improve Hadoop-on-OpenStack.
- Other Hortonworks reseller partners seem more important in terms of helping customers consumer HDP (Hortonworks Data Platform), rather than for actually doing Hortonworks’ selling for it. (This is unsurprising — channel sales rarely are a path to success for a product that is also appropriately sold by a direct force.)
- Hortonworks listed its major industry sectors as:
- Web and retailing, which it identifies as one thing.
- Health care (various subsectors).
- Financial services, which it called “competitive” in the kind of tone that usually signifies “we lose a lot more than we win, and would love to change that”.
*Speaking of CEO Bearden, an interesting note from Derrick’s piece is that Bearden is quoted as saying “I started this company from day one …”, notwithstanding that the now-departed Eric Baldeschwieler was founding CEO.
In Hortonworks’ view, Hadoop adopters typically start with a specific use case around a new type of data, such as clickstream, sensor, server log, geolocation, or social. Read more
I chatted yesterday with the Hortonworks gang. The main subject was Hortonworks’ approach to SQL-on-Hadoop — commonly called Stinger — but at my request we cycled through a bunch of other topics as well. Company-specific notes include:
- Hortonworks founder J. Eric “Eric14″ Baldeschwieler is no longer at Hortonworks, although I imagine he stays closely in touch. What he’s doing next is unspecified, except by the general phrase “his own thing”. (Derrick Harris has more on Eric’s departure.)
- John Kreisa still is at Hortonworks, just not as marketing VP. Think instead of partnerships and projects.
- ~250 employees.
- ~70-75 subscription customers.
Our deployment and use case discussions were a little confused, because a key part of Hortonworks’ strategy is to support and encourage the idea of combining use cases and workloads on a single cluster. But I did hear:
- 10ish nodes for a typical starting cluster.
- 100ish nodes for a typical “data lake” committed adoption.
- Teradata UDA (Unified Data Architecture)* customers sometimes (typically?) jumping straight to a data lake scenario.
- A few users in the 10s of 1000s of nodes. (Obviously Yahoo is one.)
- HBase used in >50% of installations.
- Hive probably even more than that.
- Hortonworks is seeing a fair amount of interest in Windows Hadoop deployments.
*By the way — Teradata seems serious about pushing the UDA as a core message.
Ecosystem notes, in Hortonworks’ perception, included:
- Cloudera is obviously Hortonworks’ biggest distro competitor. Next is IBM, presumably in its blue-forever installed base. MapR is barely on the radar screen; Pivotal’s likely rise hasn’t yet hit sales reports.
- Hortonworks evidently sees a lot of MicroStrategy and Tableau, and some Platfora and Datameer, the latter two at around the same level of interest.
- Accumulo is a big deal in the Federal government, and has gotten a few health care wins as well. Its success is all about security. (Note: That’s all consistent with what I hear elsewhere.)
I also asked specifically about OpenStack. Hortonworks is a member of the OpenStack project, contributes nontrivially to Swift and other subprojects, and sees Rackspace as an important partner. But despite all that, I think strong Hadoop/OpenStack integration is something for the indefinite future.
Hortonworks’ views about Hadoop 2.0 start from the premise that its goal is to support running a multitude of workloads on a single cluster. (See, for example, what I previously posted about Tez and YARN.) Timing notes for Hadoop 2.0 include:
- It’s been in preview/release candidate/commercial beta mode for weeks.
- Q3 is the goal; H2 is the emphatic goal.
- Yahoo’s been in production with YARN >8 months, and has no MapReduce 1 clusters left. (Yahoo has >35,000 Hadoop nodes.)
- The last months of delays have been mainly about sprucing up various APIs and protocols, which may need to serve for a similar multi-year period as Hadoop 1′s have. But there also was some YARN stabilization into May.
Frankly, I think Cloudera’s earlier and necessarily incremental Hadoop 2 rollout was a better choice than Hortonworks’ later big bang, even though the core-mission aspect of Hadoop 2.0 is what was least ready. HDFS (Hadoop Distributed File System) performance, NameNode failover and so on were well worth having, and it’s more than a year between Cloudera starting supporting them and when Hortonworks is offering Hadoop 2.0.
Hortonworks’ approach to doing SQL-on-Hadoop can be summarized simply as “Make Hive into as good an analytic RDBMS as possible, all in open source”. Key elements include: Read more
I lampoon the word “disruptive” for being badly overused. On the other hand, I often refer to the concept myself. Perhaps I should clarify.
- Market leaders serve high-end customers with complex, high-end products and services, often distributed through a costly sales channel.
- Upstarts serve a different market segment, often cheaply and/or simply, perhaps with a different business model (e.g. a different sales channel).
- Upstarts expand their offerings, and eventually attack the leaders in their core markets.
In response (this is the Innovator’s Solution part):
- Leaders expand their product lines, increasing the value of their offerings in their core markets.
- In particular, leaders expand into adjacent market segments, capturing margins and value even if their historical core businesses are commoditized.
- Leaders may also diversify into direct competition with the upstarts, but that generally works only if it’s via a separate division, perhaps acquired, that has permission to compete hard with the main business.
But not all cleverness is “disruption”.
- Routine product advancement by leaders — even when it’s admirably clever — is “sustaining” innovation, as opposed to the disruptive stuff.
- Innovative new technology from small companies is not, in itself, disruption either.
Here are some of the examples that make me think of the whole subject. Read more
|Categories: Business intelligence, Data warehousing, Hadoop, Microsoft and SQL*Server, MongoDB and 10gen, MySQL, Netezza, NewSQL, NoSQL, Oracle, Predictive modeling and advanced analytics, QlikTech and QlikView, Tableau Software||13 Comments|
I’ll start with three observations:
- Computer systems can’t be entirely tightly coupled — nothing would ever get developed or tested.
- Computer systems can’t be entirely loosely coupled — nothing would ever get optimized, in performance and functionality alike.
- In an ongoing trend, there is and will be dramatic refactoring as to which connections wind up being loose or tight.
As written, that’s probably pretty obvious. Even so, it’s easy to forget just how pervasive the refactoring is and is likely to be. Let’s survey some examples first, and then speculate about consequences. Read more