Microsoft and SQL*Server
Microsoft’s efforts in the database management, analytics, and data connectivity markets. Related subjects include:
- DATAllegro, which is being bought by Microsoft
- (in Text Technologies) Microsoft in the search, online media, and social software markets
- (in The Monash Report) Strategic issues for Microsoft, and Microsoft Office
- (in Software Memories) Historical notes on Microsoft
Vendor lock-in is an important subject. Everybody knows that. But few of us realize just how complicated the subject is, nor how riddled it is with paradoxes. Truth be told, I wasn’t fully aware either. But when I set out to write this post, I found that it just kept growing longer.
1. The most basic form of lock-in is:
- You do application development for a target set of platform technologies.
- Your applications can’t run without those platforms underneath.
- Hence, you’re locked into those platforms.
2. Enterprise vendor standardization is closely associated with lock-in. The core idea is that you have a mandate or strong bias toward having different apps run over the same platforms, because:
- That simplifies your environment, requiring less integration and interoperability.
- That simplifies your staffing; the same skill sets apply to multiple needs and projects.
- That simplifies your vendor support relationships; there’s “one throat to choke”.
- That simplifies your price negotiation.
3. That last point is double-edged; you have more power over suppliers to whom you give more business, but they also have more power over you. The upshot is often an ELA (Enterprise License Agreement), which commonly works:
- For a fixed period of time, the enterprise may use as much of a given product set as they want, with costs fixed in advance.
- A few years later, the price is renegotiated, based on then-current levels of usage.
|Categories: Amazon and its cloud, Buying processes, Cassandra, Exadata, Facebook, IBM and DB2, Microsoft and SQL*Server, MongoDB, Neo Technology and Neo4j, Open source, Oracle, SAP AG||9 Comments|
- I spent three weeks in California on a hybrid personal/business trip. I had a bunch of meetings, but not three weeks’ worth.
- The timing was awkward for most companies I wanted to see. No blame accrues to those who didn’t make themselves available.
- I came back with a nasty cough. Follow-up phone calls aren’t an option until next week.
- I’m impatient to start writing. Hence tonight’s posts. But it’s difficult for a man and his cough to be productive at the same time.
A running list of recent posts is:
- As a companion to this post, I’m publishing a very long one on vendor lock-in.
Subjects I’d like to add to that list include:
- Spark (it’s prospering).
- Databricks (ditto, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding).
- Flink (it’s interesting as the streaming technology it’s now positioned to be, rather than the overall Spark alternative it used to be positioned as but which the world didn’t need).
- DataStax, MemSQL, Zoomdata, and Neo Technology (also prospering).
- Cloudera (multiple topics, as usual).
- Analytic SQL engines (“traditional” analytic RDBMS aren’t doing well).
- Enterprises’ inconsistent views about vendor lock-in.
- Microsoft’s reinvention (it feels real).
- Metadata (it’s ever more of a thing).
- Machine learning (it’s going to be a big portion of my research going forward).
- Transitions to the cloud — this subject affects almost everything else.
Numerous tussles fit the template:
- A government wants access to data contained in one or more devices (mobile/personal or server as the case may be).
- The computer’s manufacturer or operator doesn’t want to provide it, for reasons including:
- That’s what customers prefer.
- That’s what other governments require.
- Being pro-liberty is the right and moral choice. (Yes, right and wrong do sometimes actually come into play. )
As a general rule, what’s best for any kind of company is — pricing and so on aside — whatever is best or most pleasing for their customers or users. This would suggest that it is in tech companies’ best interest to favor privacy, but there are two important quasi-exceptions: Read more
|Categories: Amazon and its cloud, Google, Microsoft and SQL*Server, Surveillance and privacy, Web analytics||2 Comments|
- Kafka has gotten considerable attention and adoption in streaming.
- Kafka is open source, out of LinkedIn.
- Folks who built it there, led by Jay Kreps, now have a company called Confluent.
- Confluent seems to be pursuing a fairly standard open source business model around Kafka.
- Confluent seems to be in the low to mid teens in paying customers.
- Confluent believes 1000s of Kafka clusters are in production.
- Confluent reports 40 employees and $31 million raised.
At its core Kafka is very simple:
- Kafka accepts streams of data in substantially any format, and then streams the data back out, potentially in a highly parallel way.
- Any producer or consumer of data can connect to Kafka, via what can reasonably be called a publish/subscribe model.
- Kafka handles various issues of scaling, load balancing, fault tolerance and so on.
So it seems fair to say:
- Kafka offers the benefits of hub vs. point-to-point connectivity.
- Kafka acts like a kind of switch, in the telecom sense. (However, this is probably not a very useful metaphor in practice.)
|Categories: Data integration and middleware, Humor, Kafka and Confluent, Market share and customer counts, Microsoft and SQL*Server, Open source, Specific users, Streaming and complex event processing (CEP)||10 Comments|
Cloudera released Version 2 of Cloudera Director, which is a companion product to Cloudera Manager focused specifically on the cloud. This led to a discussion about — you guessed it! — Cloudera and the cloud.
Making Cloudera run in the cloud has three major aspects:
- Cloudera’s usual software, ported to run on the cloud platform(s).
- Cloudera Director, which for example launches cloud instances.
- Points of integration, e.g. taking information about security-oriented roles from the platform and feeding then to the role-based security that is specific to Cloudera Enterprise.
Features new in this week’s release of Cloudera Director include:
- An API for job submission.
- Support for spot and preemptable instances.
- High availability.
- Some cluster repair.
- Some cluster cloning.
I.e., we’re talking about some pretty basic/checklist kinds of things. Cloudera Director is evidently working for Amazon AWS and Google GCP, and planned for Windows Azure, VMware and OpenStack.
As for porting, let me start by noting: Read more
When I find myself making the same observation fairly frequently, that’s a good impetus to write a post based on it. And so this post is based on the thought that there are many analogies between:
- Oracle and the Oracle DBMS.
- IBM and the IBM mainframe.
And when you look at things that way, Oracle seems to be swimming against the tide.
Drilling down, there are basically three things that can seriously threaten Oracle’s market position:
- Growth in apps of the sort for which Oracle’s RDBMS is not well-suited. Much of “Big Data” fits that description.
- Outright, widespread replacement of Oracle’s application suites. This is the least of Oracle’s concerns at the moment, but could of course be a disaster in the long term.
- Transition to “the cloud”. This trend amplifies the other two.
Oracle’s decline, if any, will be slow — but I think it has begun.
There’s a clear market lead in the core product category. IBM was dominant in mainframe computing. While not as dominant, Oracle is definitely a strong leader in high-end OTLP/mixed-use (OnLine Transaction Processing) RDBMS.
That market lead is even greater than it looks, because some of the strongest competitors deserve asterisks. Many of IBM’s mainframe competitors were “national champions” — Fujitsu and Hitachi in Japan, Bull in France and so on. Those were probably stronger competitors to IBM than the classic BUNCH companies (Burroughs, Univac, NCR, Control Data, Honeywell).
Similarly, Oracle’s strongest direct competitors are IBM DB2 and Microsoft SQL Server, each of which is sold primarily to customers loyal to the respective vendors’ full stacks. SAP is now trying to play a similar game.
The core product is stable, secure, richly featured, and generally very mature. Duh.
The core product is complicated to administer — which provides great job security for administrators. IBM had JCL (Job Control Language). Oracle has a whole lot of manual work overseeing indexes. In each case, there are many further examples of the point. Edit: A Twitter discussion suggests the specific issue with indexes has been long fixed.
Niche products can actually be more reliable than the big, super-complicated leader. Tandem Nonstop computers were super-reliable. Simple, “embeddable” RDBMS — e.g. Progress or SQL Anywhere — in many cases just work. Still, if you want one system to run most of your workload 24×7, it’s natural to choose the category leader. Read more
|Categories: Cloud computing, Database diversity, Exadata, IBM and DB2, Market share and customer counts, Microsoft and SQL*Server, NoSQL, Oracle, Software as a Service (SaaS)||25 Comments|
There’s a lot of talk these days about transitioning to the cloud, by IT customers and vendors alike. Of course, I have thoughts on the subject, some of which are below.
1. The economies of scale of not running your own data centers are real. That’s the kind of non-core activity almost all enterprises should outsource. Of course, those considerations taken alone argue equally for true cloud, co-location or SaaS (Software as a Service).
2. When the (Amazon) cloud was newer, I used to hear that certain kinds of workloads didn’t map well to the architecture Amazon had chosen. In particular, shared-nothing analytic query processing was necessarily inefficient. But I’m not hearing nearly as much about that any more.
3. Notwithstanding the foregoing, not everybody loves Amazon pricing.
4. Infrastructure vendors such as Oracle would like to also offer their infrastructure to you in the cloud. As per the above, that could work. However:
- Is all your computing on Oracle’s infrastructure? Probably not.
- Do you want to move the Oracle part and the non-Oracle part to different clouds? Ideally, no.
- Do you like the idea of being even more locked in to Oracle than you are now? [Insert BDSM joke here.]
- Will Oracle do so much better of a job hosting its own infrastructure that you use its cloud anyway? Well, that’s an interesting question.
Actually, if we replace “Oracle” by “Microsoft”, the whole idea sounds better. While Microsoft doesn’t have a proprietary server hardware story like Oracle’s, many folks are content in the Microsoft walled garden. IBM has fiercely loyal customers as well, and so may a couple of Japanese computer manufacturers.
5. Even when running stuff in the cloud is otherwise a bad idea, there’s still: Read more
|Categories: Amazon and its cloud, Cloud computing, Emulation, transparency, portability, IBM and DB2, Microsoft and SQL*Server, Oracle, Pricing||6 Comments|
This is part of a four post series spanning two blogs.
- One post gives a general historical overview of the artificial intelligence business.
- One post specifically covers the history of expert systems.
- One post gives a general present-day overview of the artificial intelligence business.
- One post (this one) explores the close connection between machine learning and (the rest of) AI.
1. I think the technical essence of AI is usually:
- Inputs come in.
- Decisions or actions come out.
- More precisely — inputs come in, something intermediate is calculated, and the intermediate result is mapped to a decision or action.
- The intermediate results are commonly either numerical (a scalar or perhaps a vector of scalars) or a classification/partition into finitely many possible intermediate outputs.
Of course, a lot of non-AI software can be described the same way.
To check my claim, please consider:
- It fits rules engines/expert systems so simply it’s barely worth saying.
- It fits any kind of natural language processing; the intermediate results might be words or phrases or concepts or whatever.
- It fits machine vision beautifully.
To see why it’s true from a bottom-up standpoint, please consider the next two points.
2. It is my opinion that most things called “intelligence” — natural and artificial alike — have a great deal to do with pattern recognition and response. Examples of what I mean include: Read more
|Categories: Facebook, Google, IBM and DB2, Microsoft and SQL*Server, Predictive modeling and advanced analytics||6 Comments|
In the previous post I broke product differentiation into 6-8 overlapping categories, which may be abbreviated as:
- (Other) trustworthiness
- User experience
and sometimes also issues in adoption and administration.
Now let’s use this framework to examine two market categories I cover — data management and, in separate post, business intelligence.
Applying this taxonomy to data management:
|Categories: Buying processes, Clustering, Data warehousing, Database diversity, Microsoft and SQL*Server, Predictive modeling and advanced analytics, Pricing||2 Comments|
- Hortonworks’ subscription revenues for the 9 months ended last September 30 appear to be:
- $11.7 million from everybody but Microsoft, …
- … plus $7.5 million from Microsoft, …
- … for a total of $19.2 million.
- Hortonworks states subscription customer counts (as per Page 55 this includes multiple “customers” within the same organization) of:
- 2 on April 30, 2012.
- 9 on December 31, 2012.
- 25 on April 30, 2013.
- 54 on September 30, 2013.
- 95 on December 31, 2013.
- 233 on September 30, 2014.
- Per Page 70, Hortonworks’ total September 30, 2014 customer count was 292, including professional services customers.
- Non-Microsoft subscription revenue in the quarter ended September 30, 2014 seems to have been $5.6 million, or $22.5 million annualized. This suggests Hortonworks’ average subscription revenue per non-Microsoft customer is a little over $100K/year.
- This IPO looks to be a sharply “down round” vs. Hortonworks’ Series D financing earlier this year.
- In March and June, 2014, Hortonworks sold stock that subsequently was converted into 1/2 a Hortonworks share each at $12.1871 per share.
- The tentative top of the offering’s price range is $14/share.
- That’s also slightly down from the Series C price in mid-2013.
And, perhaps of interest only to me — there are approximately 50 references to YARN in the Hortonworks S-1, but only 1 mention of Tez.
|Categories: Hadoop, Hortonworks, HP and Neoview, Market share and customer counts, Microsoft and SQL*Server, Pricing, Teradata, Yahoo||8 Comments|